Introduction
Recent concern over Federal budget deficits has led to many public policy proposals. Proposals range from short-term combinations of tax-expenditure changes to long-term changes like a balanced budget amendment and line-item veto provisions for the President. Since much of the debate focuses on alleged symptoms of unacceptably large deficits (high interest rates, high values of the dollar and unfavorable trade balances), these proposals may offer solutions that are temporary and, at best, offer only obscure routes to eliminating the underlying sources of deficit growth. At worst, such proposals may contribute to larger future deficits if they foster the underlying factors causing deficit growth.
Following work on the Federal sector in Manage and Marlow (1986) , we examine the causal relation between expenditures and tax revenues at the state and local levels of government. Manage and Marlow (1986) provides some evidence that Federal spending is determined by tax revenue. This paper addresses the issue of whether or not the many different fiscal constraints that exist at the state and local level affect the causal relations between tax receipts and expenditures of those governments. Motivation for our study stems from the frequently-made observation that, unlike their Federal counterpart, the finances of state and local governments are relatively well-behaved. Examination of causality may suggest how constitutional and legislative constraints have affected the finances of state and local governments. In terms of policy implications, this examination may yield information on the appropriatability of extending currently-existing constraints at the state and local levels to the Federal level of government.
*The views expressed are those of the authors alone and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Department of Treasury.
Tax revenue-expenditure relations 1
Public finances are determined by political choices subject to various constraints. The budget constraint facing governmental units consists of direct and indirect tax receipts and debt; spending must always be balanced by some combination of these funding sources. Direct tax receipts are legislated while indirect receipts are the product of inflation. Inflationary policies raise revenues by raising effective tax rates, allowing future debt payments to be repayed with deflated currency and by directly exchanging Treasury debt with cash or credits on the Federal Reserve's balance sheet. Whenever the sum of direct and indirect tax receipts is less than expenditures, the deficit must be financed by debt.
The question of how to test the revenue-expenditure relation is basically a question of causality. One-way causality implies that one variable determines the other. Two-way causality implies that both variables are simultaneously determined. A straightforward approach to assigning causality stems from the notion that funding constraints determine the spending opportunity sets of goverments; that is, spending levels are ultimately determined by budget (resource) levels. In the case of private citizens, the limits of current consumption are determined by accumulated wealth, current income and ability to borrow on projected future resources. In addition to the power to create money, a goverment's ability to consume must also be constrained by the same factors that confront private citizens.
The argument for causality in the other direction appears less compelling. For tax revenues to be determined by spending levels, the constraint would be spending levels and the choice variable that reacts to that constraint would be the funding level. Since the spending 'desires' of private citizens are boundless, we expect the same to hold in the case of government units. That is, since the study of economics argues that consumers are unable to satisfy their unlimited (spending) 'wants', how could government units succeed to fund the unlimited 'desires' of the populace? Because 'desires' are boundless, we must also argue that budgets are as well in the case of spending choices determining (causing) the funding level. This does not appear to be a useful approach. Moreover, within some feasible resource constraint, government expenditure growth probably requires growing direct tax levels since it is likely that a threshold point exists where the public will either refuse to hold larger and larger public debt portfolios, or the power to finance spending via inflation proves too onerous to economic or political stability.
Our expectation is that funding levels act as opportunity sets and determine the existing resource choices that governments choose to consume. Further, when the constraint is altered, the opportunity set is changed as
